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CASE NOTES
Antitrust Law—Robinson-Patman Act—Section 2 (c)—Commercial
Bribery.—Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson El Sons.'—Rangen bribed
Grimes, the superintendent and nutritional expert of the Idaho fish hatch-
eries, to use his best efforts to see that Rangen received Idaho's contracts for
fish foods. As a result, Grimes influenced the responsible state purchasing
officials to favor Rangen, and Nelson, a competitor of Rangen, was excluded
from the market. Nelson brought a private antitrust suit against Rangen,
claiming that the bribe was a violation of Section 2 (c) of the Robinson-
Patman Act. 2 The district court found for the plaintiff 3 and the defendant
appealed on the ground, inter alia, that section 2(c) is not applicable to
commercial bribery unassociated with price discrimination. HELD: " [S] ec-
don 2(c) is not directed solely against price discriminations through rebates
described as brokerage. .. . [T]hat subsection also encompasses cases of
commercial bribery tending to undermine the fiduciary relationship between
a buyer and its agent, representative, or other intermediary in a transaction
involving the sale or purchase of goods, wares or merchandise."4
At first glance the Robinson-Patman Act appears to be aimed at price
discrimination only. The act was an amendment to Section 2 of the Clayton
Act.° Its purpose was to prevent practices devised by businessmen to cir-
cumvent the Clayton Act, which only "condemned in principle the practice
of price discrimination in private competitive business.. • ."8 The first section
of the Robinson-Patman Act deals with out-and-out price discrimination in
an expanded version of the wording used in the Clayton Act. 7 In light of the
legislative history,8 it is clear that the other sections were aimed at various
forms of price discrimination and that section 2(c) was specifically intended
to prohibit price discrimination in the forms of rebates and dummy broker-
ages. Moreover, the legislative history of the act is replete with references to
price discrimination devices, such as brokerage paid "where true brokerage
services have not been rendered," 0 and with references to the dangerous
effects of price discrimination upon competition."
1 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 1067 (1966).
2 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964):	 -
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a com-
mission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu
thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of
goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to
an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary
is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control,
of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensa-
tion is so granted or paid,
3 Sterling Nelson & Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393 (D. Idaho 1964).
4 Supra note 1, at 858.
5 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
8 80 Cong. Rec. 6621 (1936) (remarks of Representative Miller).
7 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
8 See, e.g., 80 Cong. Rec. 6281-82 (1936) (remarks of Senator Logan).
9 80 Cong. Rec. 6623 (1936) (remarks of Representative Miller).
10 80 Cong. Rec. 6622 (1936) (remarks of Representative Miller).
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Despite the one-sidedness of the wording and the legislative background
of the Robinson-Patman Act, the court in Rangen reached the conclusion
that commercial bribery, unassociated with price discrimination, is a violation
of section 2(c). In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on three
premises. First, the wording of that section contains nothing "which requires
that [the] subsection ... be limited to instances of price discrimination.""
Second, nothing in the legislative history excludes commercial bribery from
its application; in fact, there are specific references to bribes which tend to
undermine the fiduciary relationship between employer and employee. 12
Third, several cases" support the proposition that section 2 (c) does not
require price discrimination as an element of a violation. In addition, the
court relied upon Fitch v. Kentucky-Tenn. Light & Power Co.," which
reached the specific conclusion that commercial bribery is a violation of
section 2 (c).
Although this rationale is correct, as far as it goes, it is unconvincing.
The fact that the wording of the statute does not require that it be "limited
to instances of price discrimination" is hardly adequate authority for the
proposition that commercial bribery is included within the statute's prohibi-
tion. It merely shows that commercial bribery was not specifically excluded.
Also, the references in the legislative history to commercial bribery are few,
and too weak and secondary to be authority for the present case's holding:
the references in the history are overwhelmingly directed toward price
discrimination.
The case precedent upon which the court depended for the proposition
that section 2(c) does not require price discrimination consists entirely
of cases which involved some form of price discrimination—dummy brokerage
or out-and-out rebates." Thus, these cases, too, present no affirmative
ground for a decision that commercial bribery which does not effect price
discrimination violates the section.
Finally, the Fitch case, which reached the same conclusion as Rangen,
offers no better rationale. It relied upon the same basic premises as Rangen
except that there was no allusion to the legislative history at all. Fitch further
reasoned that commercial bribery is an unfair trade practice" but then
proceeded in broad generalities without ever stating why, if commercial
bribery is an antitrust wrong, section 2(c) is the cure." Neither Rangen nor
Fitch, therefore, state any direct or positive reason why the Robinson-Patman
Act is the applicable law.
11 Supra note 1, at 856.
12 80 Cong. Rec. 8112 (1936) (remarks of Representative Patman).
13 FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1959) (dummy
brokerage); Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945) (brokerage
paid to a broker on purchases for its own account); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC,
106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939) (reduced prices); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687
(2d Cir. 1938) (dummy brokerage).
14 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1959).
15 See cases cited note 13 supra.
15 Fitch v. Kentucky-Tenn. Light Sr Power Co., supra note 14, at 16.
17 See Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1414), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(1) (1964).
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What the court in Rangen should have done was to stress the basic anti-
trust policies behind the Robinson-Patman Act, ascertain the precise anti-
competitive effects of price discrimination and commercial bribery, compare
these effects for their similarities and differences, and determine whether the
differences, if any, necessitated the conclusion that commercial bribery does
not fall within section 2(c).
In price discrimination, one of several competing buyers receives goods
at reduced cost so that he may sell at a price below that of his competitors.
It should be noted that the unfair advantage over competitors originates in
one market and operates in another. In the case of commercial bribery, one
seller is able to exclude his competitors from a market by bribing a fiduciary
of the buyer to influence his principal to give the seller an exclusive market.
The result is the same as in price discrimination—competing sellers are un-
able to compete effectively. But in commercial bribery, the unfair advantage
originates in the same market in which it operates. The question with which
the court would then have been faced is whether it is relevant where the un-
fair advantage originates; and to this question the court could have easily
and soundly answered "no," emphasizing that the tendency toward a
lessening of competition is the same, regardless of where the unfair advantage
originates.
STEVEN D. OSTROWSKY
Bankruptcy Act—Strong Arm Clause—Invalidity of Unfiled Federal
Tax Lien Against Trustee.—United States v. Speers.i—On June 3, 1960,
respondent-trustee's bankrupt was assessed for unpaid federal taxes. Demand
for payment was made but not met, giving rise to a lien under Section 6321
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, but no notice was filed as provided
in section 6323. On June 20, the bankrupt filed his voluntary petition in
bankruptcy. Respondent contended that the federal tax lien is invalid as
to him, since Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act2—the so-called Strong
Arm Clause—gives him the rights of a judgment creditor and Section 6323
of the Internal Revenue Code invalidates an unfiled lien as against a judg-
ment creditor. He prevailed before the referee, the district court, and on
appeal to the Sixth Circuit. 3
 Certiorari was granted because of a conflict
with decisions in the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits.' HELD: Affirmed.
1 382 U.S. 266 (1965).
2
 66 Stat. 430 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964).
3 In re Kurtz Roofing Co., 335 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1964).
4
 Simonson v. Granquist, 287 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 369
U.S. 38 (1962); In re Fidelity Tube Corp., 278 F.2d 776 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Borough of East Newark v. United States, 364 U.S. 828 (1960) ; Brust v. Sturr, 237 F.2d
135 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v. England, 226 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1955). Accord, In
re Estrada's Market, 222 F. Supp. 253 (S.D. Cal. 1963); In re National Insul
-Fluf, Inc.,
Bankr. L. Rep. V 58559 (S.D. Cal. 1956); In re Green, 124 F. Supp. 481 (ND. Ala. 1954);
In re Ann Arbor Brewing Co., 110 F. Supp. 111 (ED. Mich. 1951); In re Taylorcraft
Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948) (dictum). Contra, In re Sport Coal Co., 125
F. Supp. 517 (S.D.W.Va. 1954), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Eiland,
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